Moral Judgment and Moral Action: Question Framing Effects in Moral Decision-Making

Abstract: When asked questions that are framed by moral action rather than by moral judgment, dual-process moral theory posits that people will tend to be more deontological or more sensitive to norms because of a stronger moral-disgust arousal to a sacrificing proposal (e.g., sacrifice one innocent life to save five or more others). However, the action-based model of cognitive dissonance predicts that the decision-maker will be less deontological or less sensitive to norms because of the stronger motivation to reduce the dissonance state. In the present research, three studies (N = 960) were conducted to clarify this moral-question framing effect. Study 1 utilized a classic moral dilemma paradigm to preliminarily assess the moral-question framing effect. Study 2 applied a 2 (norm: proscriptive/prescriptive) × 2 (consequence: benefits greater than/smaller than costs) × 2 (frame: moral judgment/moral action) within-subject design and a new algorithm to further define the boundary conditions of the moral-question framing effect. Study 3 adopted a consequences–norms–generalized inaction/action preferences (CNI) model to validate the new algorithm and the results of Study 2. Together, the results show that participants were less sensitive to norms, were more sensitive to consequences, and transitioned from a generalized action preference to a generalized inaction preference when they were asked moral action- versus moral judgment-framed questions. Thus, the present research supports the action-based model of cognitive dissonance and reveals that moral decision-making is affected by the motivation process. Theoretical and methodological implications are also discussed."